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HIV/AIDS is the greatest health threat facing humankind – particularly for those 
people living in Southern Africa.  Of the estimated 40 million people infected 
with HIV worldwide, over two thirds live in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Southern 
African countries top the HIV prevalence tables.  According to the World Bank, 
if AIDS had not affected Southern Africa, ‘life expectancy would have reached 
64 by 2010-15.  Instead, it will have regressed to 47, reversing the gains of the 
past 30 years’ (2001: 139).  Figure 1 shows how life expectancy rose in the 10 
Southern African countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, but then fell 
sharply in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic and economic crisis took their toll.   
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Source:  World Bank data from WEFA. 
 
 
HIV prevalence rates vary across the Southern African countries (see Table 1).   
Although HIV trends in HIV prevalence are correlated (negatively) with trends 
in life expectancy, there is no correlation between the level of life expectancy 
and HIV prevalence across countries.  This is because life expectancy is also 
affected by other factors such as war (which lowered life expectancy in 






can be seen in Table 1, Southern African countries are at very different levels of 
development, with per capita income ranging from almost $4000 in South 
Africa, to less than $200 in Mozambique.   
 
 














































Angola $506 47 5.5 320000 24000 100000 N/A 
Botswana $3951 39 38.8 300000 26000 69000 31% 
Lesotho $551 44 31.0 330000 25000 73000 11% 
Malawi $169 39 15.0 780000 80000 470000 65% 
Mozam-
bique 
$191 42 13.0 1000000 60000 420000 N/A 
Namibia $2408 47 22.5 200000 13000 47000 40% 
South 
Africa 
$3985 48 20.1 4700000 360000 660000 16% 
Swaziland $1476 46 33.4 150000 12000 35000 N/A 
Zambia $392 38 21.5 1000000 120000 570000 65% 
Zimbabwe $621 40 33.7 2000000 200000 780000 68% 
Source: UNAIDS (2002: 190), WEFA data, * Data from the Afrobarometer 
(Whiteside et al (2002: 16, 28)). 
 
 
South Africa dominates the Southern African region economically, and is a 
major epicentre of the AIDS pandemic.  Almost half the number of HIV positive 
people in Southern Africa lives in South Africa.  This is already having a 
devastating effect on young adults.  As can be seen in Figure 2, South African 
death rates have increased dramatically in the age-group 15 to 39.  Commenting 
on this trend, Dr Makgoba, the then head of South Africa’s Medical Research 
Council, commented that only a war could result in comparable deaths amongst 







But unlike a war situation, the increase in mortality has been especially horrific 
for women (especially young women) who are more vulnerable than men to 
HIV infection.  Figure 2 shows a sharp increase in the number of deaths for 
South African women in their twenties over the past five years.  This is a 
function of the biology of HIV infection (women are more easily infected than 
men1), and of the social and economic disadvantages experienced by women 
(Walker and Gilbert, 2002).  This pattern of increased vulnerability of women to 
HIV infection is replicated across Africa (see UNAIDS (1999) and Baylies and 
Bujra, 2001: 1-24).   
 
 




Source: Dorrington et al, 2001:29 
 
 
Why is it that AIDS has proved so much more deadly in Africa than anywhere 
else in the world?  Early approaches to the AIDS pandemic focussed on the 
pathogen (the HI virus) and on the behavioural determinants of HIV 
transmission.  More recent research has focussed on the immune system’s 
                                          
1  All else being equal, women are between two and four times more likely than men to 
experience HIV infection from a sexual encounter.  Reasons include higher concentrations of 
HIV in semen than in vaginal fluid, the larger area of exposed female than male genital 
surface area, the longer period of exposure of semen in the vaginal tract, and the greater 
permeability of the mucous membranes in the vagina compared to the penis (see summary of 






                                          
response to HIV.  There is now a strong body of biomedical evidence showing 
that ‘malnutrition and parasite infection increase HIV susceptibility, not only to 
opportunistic infection after HIV infection, but also to HIV transmission, just as 
they increase susceptibility to other infectious diseases’ (Stillwaggon, 2002: 4).2   
Given that malnutrition is a function of poverty, there is thus good reason for 
assuming that poverty helped hasten the spread of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
As Stillwaggon observes, “From 1988 to 1998, when nascent or concentrated 
AIDS epidemics developed into generalised epidemics in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
30 percent of the region was malnourished” (2002: 5).  Micro-nutrient 
deficiencies (particularly Vitamins A, C, and B) undermine the body’s natural 
defences against HIV infection – i.e. skin integrity and mucous membranes), 
thus contributing further to the vulnerability to HIV infection.  Parasite 
infections, mainly malaria, schistosomiasis (bilharzia), trypanosomiasis 
(sleeping sickness) and intestinal parasites undermine nutritional status and 
compromise the immune system yet further – effectively by exhausting it.    
Such parasite infections are endemic in Africa, but the situation is made worse 
by inadequate health care (which leaves most parasite infections untreated) – 
itself a function of poverty and low levels of development.  There is, in other 
words, a strong link between poverty, low levels of development and the pace of 
HIV transmission.  Figure 3 summarises these pathways.  
 
Sexual behaviour is obviously an important driver of the epidemic – especially 
in Africa where transmission is overwhelmingly heterosexual.  However, it is 
important to note that it is the combination of socio-economic and biomedical 
factors with unsafe sexual practices that produces the lethal basis for the spread 
of HIV in Africa.  Sexual behaviour on its own cannot account for the spread of 
HIV.  According to a study of difference in HIV spread in four Sub-Saharan 
African cities, high rates of partner change, contacts with sex workers, and 
concurrent sexual partnerships were not reported more systematically in the high 
prevalence than in the low prevalence sites (UNAIDS, 1999).  Co-factors such 
as male circumcision (which appears to provide a degree of protection from HIV 
infection), the presence of untreated STDs and the age of marriage for young 
women were highlighted by the study.   
 
Economic factors reinforce unsafe practices – especially where sex is a currency 
by which African women and girls are frequently ‘expected to pay for life’s 
opportunities, from a passing grade in school to a trading license or permission 
to cross a border’ (UNAIDS quoted in Baylies and Bujra, 2001: 7).  Poverty 






exacerbates the situation by encouraging women to engage in sex as an 
economic strategy for survival (Akeroyd, 1997).   A recent newspaper article on 
Zambia (which is experiencing famine in many parts of the country) reported 
that women were charging two Zambian dollars for sex – and double if the man 
did not want to use a condom.  According to the local medical officer, these 
women ‘are educated about the virus, but say that they would rather die of AIDS 
than hunger’ (Mail and Guardian, November 1-7, 2002).   In other words, it is 
important to address the issue of sexual behaviour and behavioural change when 
combating the AIDS pandemic.  But such programmes need to be relevant to the 
specific economic and bio-medical circumstances of the people they are aimed 
at – and most importantly, should be introduced as part of a broader strategy to 
boost economic development and empower women. 
 
 
Figure 3.  The Links between Socio-Economic, Biomedical and 
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Having touched on the patterns and determinants of the HIV epidemic in 
Southern Africa, let me now turn to the main topic of the paper:  the 
implications of HIV/AIDS for human security in Southern Africa, and for global 






                                          
part on what is meant by the term ‘security’.  In this paper, I will not be 
addressing the relationship between AIDS and security/peace-keeping forces (as 
is, for example, addressed by the UNAIDS Initiative on HIV/AIDS and 
Security.3).  I will instead be adopting a more socio-economic perspective on the 
issue.      
 
 
Human Security Understood in Developmental 
Terms as ‘Economic Security’ 
 
If we understand human security in developmental terms,4 i.e. by focussing on 
issues like: ‘food security’, ‘income security’ and ‘security of health’, then the 
answer is direct and negative:  AIDS undermines economic security by reducing 
the productivity of (and eventually killing) income-earners whilst 
simultaneously diverting scarce household resources towards medical 
expenditure.  This double squeeze on household security is increasingly well 
documented in the growing body of research on the impact of AIDS on 
households in South and Southern Africa.5  Women are especially hard-hit 
because they carry the burden of the disease and yet are expected to care for 
other members of the household who are also HIV positive (Walker and Gilbert, 
2002: 82).   
 
However, the devastating economic impact of AIDS does not stop at the 
household level.  HIV/AIDS also reduces productivity at work and increases 
production costs for firms (Aventin and Huard, 2000).  This, together with the 
negative impact of HIV/AIDS on income and consumption, acts to slow growth.  
According to Bonnel: ‘…in the case of a typical sub-Saharan country with a 
prevalence rate of 20 percent’, the growth rate of per capita income would be 
reduced by 1.2 percentage points a year because of AIDS (2000: 846).6 
3   See http://www.unaids.org/security.org/security 
4  See the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) for a discussion of human 
security as a developmental objective. 
5   See Parker et al, 2000: 41-7 for a bibliography of the impact of HIV/AIDS on households.  
Recent South African survey data indicates that AIDS-affected households draw down 
savings to finance medical expenditure and funerals (Booysen et al, 2001) and cut back on 
expenditure on clothes, electricity, food and school fees (Steinberg et al, 2002: 39).   
6  Note that the estimated impact of AIDS on per capita income is sensitive to underlying 
assumptions  – especially HIV prevalence across skill bands and the proportion of health care 
that is financed out of savings (Over, 1992).  According to Bloom and Mahal (1997), AIDS 






                                                                                                                                   
Government efficiency is also likely to be undermined by HIV/AIDS – thus 
reducing the capacity of government to deliver social and economic services.  
Slower growth in turn reduces the tax capacity of the economy, thus 
undermining any potential developmental role for the state.  Household 
economic security is thus threatened directly (through the morbidity and 
mortality of household members) and indirectly (via the negative ‘second-
round’ impact of AIDS on the macro economy and on government).  Increased 
poverty in turn increases vulnerability to HIV infection.  These connections are 
summarised in Figure 4.  
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Not everyone, of course, will be affected equally by the AIDS pandemic.  
Indeed some people may benefit absolutely (e.g. undertakers, the suppliers of 
certain drugs, etc.) and others may become relatively better off (although not 
output growth are projected to fall by the same amount).  Two out of the three 
macroeconomic models of the impact of AIDS in South Africa predict that AIDS will result in 
rising per capita incomes (as population is more adversely affected than growth), whilst a 
third model predicts that per capita incomes will fall (see Nattrass, 2002).  Modelling results 






                                          
necessarily absolutely better off) as the economy declines.  There is no reliable 
data on the impact of AIDS on inequality, but there is some South African 
evidence to suggest that inequality may well rise in that country.  HIV 
prevalence is higher amongst the unskilled and unemployed than it is for the 
more skilled and employed sectors of the population.7  If firms react to this by 
decreasing their reliance on unskilled labour (a trend that started before the 
AIDS pandemic) and by moving out of economic sectors whose customer-base 
comprises lower-income consumers (i.e. those most likely to be affected by 
AIDS), then poor households will find themselves doubly disadvantaged.  Not 
only will their access to the labour market become ever more tenuous, but the 
products that they purchase may become scarcer (and more costly).  Conversely, 
relatively skilled workers could benefit from greater employment opportunities 
(as production becomes more skill- and capital-intensive) and from higher 
wages (as the relative demand for skilled labour increases).  Those who are HIV 
positive may also live longer and more productive lives as firms begin to 
provide them with access to anti-retroviral medication.  The size of the pie may 
shrink as a result of AIDS, but employed (especially skilled) workers may well 
enjoy a growing share.   
 
This scenario of rising inequality is, however, probably pertinent only to South 
Africa (and to a limited extent also to Botswana).  Unlike their poorer 
neighbours, South Africa and Botswana have a significant minerals and 
industrial base.  Large companies in both countries have an incentive (and the 
resources) to maximise the working lives of their skilled workers.  The large 
mining companies in both countries, for example, provide anti-retroviral 
medication to their workers.  I am not aware of any similar programmes 
anywhere else in Southern Africa.  In poor, war-damaged countries like Angola 
and Mozambique, AIDS is likely to have a greater levelling effect.  Skilled and 
unskilled workers in towns and peasants in rural areas will probably all suffer 
and die with little hope of life-prolonging treatment.  Lower productivity in 
agriculture will, in turn, reduce both food security and economic security.  
 
 
7  This is in large part due to the fact that the highest rates of HIV prevalence are amongst 
Africans, who tend to bear the brunt of unemployment and perform almost all the unskilled 
work (see discussion in Nattrass (2002).  According to the World Bank (2001: 139), the South 
African pattern conforms to the general shift in the profile of HIV positive people from being 
initially (in the 1980s) based amongst higher socio-economic groups, to a disease of poor 






                                          
Human Security Understood as Policing/State 
Security 
  
If we understand ‘human security’ in the older sense of ‘state security’ and a 
‘crime-free society’, then the focus of discussion becomes more oriented 
towards policing.  Analysts in the ‘security studies’ industry have attempted to 
portray AIDS as a security threat of this kind.  For example, Schonteich (2001) 
argues that children orphaned by AIDS pose a very serious threat to Southern 
Africa in terms of future levels of crime.  He argues that as AIDS orphans are 
likely to be traumatised, uncared for, discriminated against and socially 
excluded, they will tend to display delinquent and violent criminal behaviour.  
Whilst admitting that there is insufficient African research on the matter, he 
nevertheless goes on to predict that Southern Africa will experience ‘a 
significant increase in violent interpersonal crime such as murder, rape and 
assault’ (2001: 7).  Accordingly, he argues that ‘adequately staffed and 
resourced juvenile detention centres, rehabilitation and diversion programmes 
for young offenders and effective children’s court systems will have to feature 
more prominently on governments’ list of priorities in the future’ (Schonteich, 
2001: 8). 
 
Orphans are obviously a tragic social problem.  But is the problem they pose a 
policing/security one?  According to UNAIDS, there are 3 124 000 AIDS 
orphans in Southern Africa, of which 660 000 live in South Africa (see Table 1).  
This is clearly a humanitarian disaster of epic proportions.  However, there is 
little evidence as yet to cast the issue as a policing/security problem – and none 
whatsoever to justify the argument that building juvenile detention centres is an 
appropriate policy response.    
 
Firstly, it is not obvious that African orphans will be inadequately socialised if 
they lose one or both parents.  Given the combination of the extended family 
system and the migrant labour system in Africa, it is fairly common for children 
to be brought up in households headed by neither parent – and for both parents 
to be missing for a large part of the time.8  Prime ‘role-models’ for African 
children could be grandparents or uncles, aunts or cousins.  Zambian research 
8  For example, a recent survey of African working-class areas in Cape Town revealed that 
18% of Africans grew up during some or all of their childhood in households that were not 
headed by either their mother or father, and that 11% grew up in households in which neither 
mother nor father was present for some or all of the time (own analysis of the  






                                          
suggests that the main problem with losing biological parents appears to be not 
an absence of alternative role models and care-givers – but rather emotional 
distress (Poulter, 2001: 15).  Psychological distress is in turn exacerbated by 
poverty.  As Grainger et al conclude from their overview, the ‘psychosocial 
impacts of HIV/AIDS are closely linked with other factors such as declining 
household income, hunger and poor health status’ (2001: 29).  
 
Secondly, there is no substantive evidence that care-givers systematically treat 
AIDS orphans differently to other members of the household.  According to a 
recent study in Lusaka, there was no correlation between orphan status and 
stunting – thus indicating that ‘orphans were not being fed a poorer diet than 
other children in the household’ (Poulter, 2001: 12).  The study also found that 
‘families are providing support to relatives who are sick and to orphans, despite 
the hardships that many families are experiencing (2001: 17).  This finding was 
echoed by another Zambian study:  ‘despite the devastating impact of AIDS on 
family structures in the country, the extended family is still the main care 
provider for almost all the orphaned children in the survey’ (Nampanya-Serpell, 
2001: 16).  A Uganda study noted that while care-givers are increasingly 
burdened by the AIDS pandemic, ‘most experts do not believe that the African 
family structure has “collapsed” under the weight of AIDS’ (Gilborn, 2001: 4).  
 
There is, of course, evidence indicating that HIV-positive children and children 
of HIV-positive parents are vulnerable to stigmatisation and discrimination at 
school, in the community and sometimes even in the home (see Strode and 
Grant, 2001: 15-26,  Grainger et al, 2001: 13-41).  There is also evidence that 
orphans face particular economic hardships – especially those who find 
themselves heading households at a young age, or living with elderly relatives 
with little or no source of income (Gilborn et al, 2002).  Reports such as these 
are worrying.  But rather than indulging in what amounts to little more than a 
‘moral panic’9 about orphans and arguing, on this basis,10 that more resources 
9  In the early 1990s in South Africa, there was a media outcry about the problem of the so-
called ‘lost generation’ of African youth – i.e. young people who had had their education 
disrupted by the anti-apartheid struggle.  The fear was that these people would boost the ranks 
of criminals and exercise a severely disruptive impact on society.  Seekings (1995, 1996) 
argued that this amounted to a ‘moral panic’ and that there was no evidence to substantiate 
these fears.  Current arguments about orphans – especially by security studies consultants –  
have the same hysterical, prejudiced and unsubstantiated ring to them.  
10  Crime is clearly an issue for people living in Southern Africa.  As can be seen in Table 2, it 
featured fairly high up on people’s political agendas.  But the crime problem preceded AIDS, 






should be put into policing and the criminal justice system, we should be 
thinking about how to address the dual scourge of AIDS and poverty.  Family 
and community resources are clearly being stretched and sorely tested by AIDS.  
The appropriate response is to empower households economically to cope with 
all dimensions of the AIDS pandemic.   AIDS is an issue for human security in 
the developmental sense of the term – rather than the security/policy sense of the 
term.   
 
What, then, does this mean for the main focus of this conference:  ‘HIV and 
Global Security?’  What is the connection between AIDS and human security in 
Southern Africa on the one hand, and global security on the other?   
 
 
AIDS and Government in Southern Africa 
 
Let me start out by saying that I am no expert on global security!   I have no idea 
if one can even begin to trace out a theory which links issues of human security 
and global inequality to security issues like international war and terrorism.  
Rather than attempt such a task, I will proceed on the basis of a simple fact – 
that no democracy has ever gone to war with another democracy – and ask 
whether AIDS has any implications for democratic transition and sustainability 
in Southern Africa.    
 
In their definitive cross-country analysis, Przeworski et al (2000) show that the 
probability of a democracy surviving ‘increases steeply and monotonically as 
per capita incomes get larger’ and that ‘democracy is almost certain to survive in 
countries with per capita incomes above $4000’ (2000: 273).  According to this 
analysis, democracies are fragile in poor countries.  As shown in Table 1, most 
Southern African countries are poor and only two (South Africa and Botswana) 
come close to per capita incomes of $4000.   
 
In other words, to the extent that AIDS undermines per capita economic growth 
in Southern Africa, it will also increase the likelihood of democratic failure.  
Southern African countries have democratic institutions – but for the most part, 
these do not function very well (the most notable case at present being 
Zimbabwe where democracy has been all but destroyed).  Given the fragile basis 
for democracy in Southern Africa, it is possible that the burden of AIDS on 
growth could tip the balance in favour of dictatorship in some counties.  And, 






                                          
than democratic regimes, the suggestion is thus that AIDS in Southern Africa 
has implications for global security – albeit via this rather indirect route.           
 
A related fear is that AIDS could somehow result in greater political instability 
(perhaps through its corrosive impact on social structures, social capital, 
political participation, etc.) which in turn could undermine development and 
democracy – and hence threaten global security.  There are, however, several 
problems with this analysis.  Firstly, it is not clear what relationship (if any) 
exists between AIDS, democracy and forms of political participation.  For 
example, research from the Afrobarometer revealed no evidence for any adverse 
impact of illness on political participation: 
 
‘…illness does not significantly decrease people’s interest in politics, 
or their trust in other people (a factor often identified as a crucial 
component of public participation).  Neither does ill-health decrease 
levels of participation in community organisations in non-voting 
forms of political participation, or the rate at which people contact 
elected leaders.  Thus, the least healthy Africans appear as likely to 
participate in political procedures and civil society as the most 
healthy’ (Whiteford et al, 2002: 34-5).   
 
Secondly, it is not clear what impact AIDS will have on political demands by 
citizens.  Is AIDS likely to result in mass mobilisation in favour of increased 
health care?  Could this be destabilising – either politically or economically if 
government budgets balloon to unsustainable levels?  Recent data from the 
Afrobarometer can help shed light on these questions.   
 
The Afrobarometer collected data on political attitudes, socio-economic 
indicators and various other attitudes (including those on AIDS) in seven 
Southern African countries between July 1999 and July 2000.  Each survey 
comprised a random, stratified, nationally-representative sample of 
approximately 1 200 individuals.11  The following open-ended question was 
asked:  ‘What are the most important problems facing this country that the 
government should address?’  Given the high HIV prevalence rates amongst 
adults in Southern Africa and the large number of AIDS deaths per year (see 
Table 1) one might have expected HIV/AIDS to feature high on the public 
agenda.  However, as indicated in Table 2, economic issues – especially job 






       
creation – were clearly the top priorities.  Only in Zambia did people 
spontaneously refer to health issues more often than economic issues.  
 
 
Table 2: Spontaneously Reported Political Priorities 
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Source: Whiteside et al, 2002: 30.  Only those problems referred to by more than 
10 percent of respondents.  
 
 
According to Whiteford et al, the relative ranking of HIV/AIDS for government 
action by Afrobarometer respondents did not vary systematically with HIV 
prevalence, the proportion of respondents who knew someone who had died of 
AIDS, or the number of cumulative deaths from AIDS (2002: 29).  They suggest 






                                          
that issues pertaining to immediate income needs were forced to the forefront of 
people’s consciousness.  The fact that poorer people were less likely to cite 
AIDS as a problem than richer people perhaps constitutes evidence for this 
position (ibid: 31).  Whatever the reason, the bottom line is that AIDS and health 
issues are not, for the most part, perceived as political priorities by the general 
Southern African population.   
 
If governments are to feel any direct political pressure to do anything dramatic 
about AIDS, this is likely to come from well-organised, single-issue NGO’s like 
the Treatment Action Campaign12 in South Africa. 
 
But what about the future?  Are citizens likely to alter their political priorities in 
favour of health care as the AIDS pandemic continues to reap its grim harvest?  
This is impossible to predict – especially given the close relationship between 
AIDS, poverty and vulnerability.  AIDS kills young productive adults, thus 
plummeting poor households into poverty.  Under such conditions, it would 
hardly be surprising if job creation and welfare continue were to continue to be 
prioritised over health expenditure – even by those most devastated by AIDS.    
 
One could hypothesize that the socio-economic crisis resulting from AIDS will 
undermine political stability if citizens believed that not enough is being done to 
address the key issues pertaining to incomes, jobs and welfare.  It is impossible 
to tell whether this is likely or not, but even if it were, the question remains 
whether it matters if there is greater political instability or not.  According to one 
influential view (popularised by Huntington (1968)), any political instability is 
bad because it undermines development.  In terms of this framework, 
maintaining ‘order’ is a key development objective – even if that means 
supporting non-democratic regimes to maintain power.   This argument has, 
however, been devastated by Przeworski et al (2000).  They show that political 
instability has no effect on growth in democracies and has negative (but short-
term only) effects on growth in dictatorships (2000: 193-9).  In other words, a 
blanket concern with political instability is inappropriate.  Some forms of 
instability (such as a change in government following a democratic election) are 
desirable politically and have no adverse economic consequences.  Other forms 
of instability (such as pro-democracy demonstrations in a dictatorship) may 
adversely affect short-term growth – but may still be worth it in developmental 
12  The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) is a well organized South African NGO.  Its hard-
hitting and well-researched campaigns have forced the South African government to provide 
anti-retroviral treatment to HIV positive pregnant women.  TAC is currently negotiating with 






terms if they contribute to democratic transition.  People are better off under 
democracies – both in terms of economic development and of human freedom.  
It is thus highly dubious to portray all political instability as a human security 
issue.  Human security is best linked clearly and absolutely to democracy.        
 
What, then, should Southern African governments do – or be encouraged to do – 
about AIDS?  Should they concentrate on prevention, treatment, or a mixture of 
strategies?  And if treatment is to be rationed, who should get it?  Given that 
women are particularly vulnerable to HIV infection, is there any way of 
targeting them especially – or is their lower socio-economic status so intractable 
that it requires major social transformation to empower them adequately?  
Similarly, what sort of AIDS education awareness and prevention programmes 
are needed to impact on a culture in which men are expected to have multiple 
partners?    
 
Such questions of design are very important – and there are as yet few clear 
answers to any of them.  Evaluations of AIDS policy programmes typically 
stress the complex inter-relationships between socio-economic and behavioural 
determinants of HIV transmission, and the burden these place on policy design.  
Successful programmes need to be relevant to the cultural and economic context 
in which they are applied, should include the target audience as active 
participants in design and implementation, and should empower people to 
transform their behaviour (see e.g. Baylies and Bujra (2001), Grainger et al 
(2001) and Strode and Grant (2001)).  They also need to be consistent with an 
overall developmental and anti-poverty orientation to government economic 
policy.   
 
This is a pretty tall order.  As Poku puts it: 
 
‘Until poverty is reduced there will be little progress with either 
reducing transmission of the virus or creating an enhanced capacity to 
cope with its socio-economic consequences.  It follows that sustained 
human development is an essential precondition for any effective 
response to the pandemic in Africa.  Herein lies Africa’s predicament: 
how to achieve the sustainable development essential for an effective 
response to the pandemic under conditions where the pandemic is 
destructive of the capacities essential for the response – namely, 
killing the most economically productive members of the continent’s 
people.  Simple answers to this problem do not exist, but recognition 







Recognition of the nature of the problem is an important step – but it really is 
not necessarily clear what the next step should be.  Governments have to decide 
how many resources to allocate to AIDS-related programmes – and at what 
opportunity cost for other programmes.  Should government spend less on road 
construction, or small business development, or on the tertiary educational 
system, in order to fund AIDS interventions?  One could, of course, argue that 
Southern African governments should restructure their budgets at a fundamental 
level in order to deal with the epidemic.  Obvious candidates include cutting 
expenditure on defence and improving public sector efficiency.  However, given 
that governments had good developmental reasons to embark on such changes 
many years ago, there are clearly institutional and political obstacles in the way 
of making them.  Until such time as strong democratic pressures arise for 
governments to be more accountable and efficient, very little is likely to change 
in this respect.  Southern African governments will thus almost certainly 
continue to address the AIDS pandemic unevenly, unsystematically, and with 
limited resources.  
 
 
Implications for the Donor Community 
 
So what should the donor community do under these circumstances?  I am no 
expert on this either, but here are three principles which I think should guide 
policy responses.      
 
Principle one:  keep focussed on the development objective.  Southern African 
citizens clearly prioritise income needs over immediate health needs, and there 
is a strong link between economic insecurity and the spread of AIDS.    
• Support labour-intensive growth strategies – particularly those that 
channel jobs and resources to poor areas. 
• Support calls for debt relief, but keep pressure on beneficiary 
governments to allocate the resources thereby freed up to genuinely 
developmental objectives.   
• Support programmes that provide food security for people – 
especially in times of famine – and those that improve the socio-
economic position of women in society.    
• Where possible, build an AIDS-awareness and education 
component into existing development projects (e.g. in schools, 






                                          
 
Principle two: where additional donor resources are available, support 
interventions which are relevant to the context and which empower people to 
change their lives – particularly those at greatest risk.   
• Research the local situation and make sure that the AIDS treatment 
and prevention programmes are appropriate and genuinely 
transformative. 
• Pay specific attention to the needs of, and constraints facing, young 
women and poor households.  
 
Principle three:  keep hope alive.  Given the already high rates of HIV 
prevalence in Southern Africa, it is important to reach the large constituency of 
HIV positive people, and not simply to concentrate on AIDS-awareness and 
prevention campaigns.  Anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment is conventionally 
regarded as ‘too expensive’ for developing countries (especially those in 
Africa).  However, the cost of ARV treatment has fallen sharply over the past 
two years, and with the growth of generic medication, is likely to fall further.  
This, together with the fact that people on ARVs get sick less often – thus 
freeing up public health resources in this regard – puts ARV treatment in the 
range of viable health interventions for many developing countries.13  Offering 
the possibility of life-lengthening treatment to HIV positive people has the 
additional benefit of encouraging more people to be tested and to receive post-
test counselling – which in turn should help change behaviour and reduce new 
HIV infections.  Donors should thus also:   
• Put pressure on pharmaceutical companies to lower their drug 
prices for developing countries.    
• Encourage and assist Southern African countries to provide access 
to ARV treatment for HIV positive people.                   
13  See Nattrass (2001) for a discussion of the ethics and economics of providing anti-
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